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“HE WAS MURDERED”: VIOLENCE AGAINST KURIA HIGH AFTER BARRICK TAKEOVER OF MINE



REPORT ON RESEARCH IN NORTH MARA, TANZANIA
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ABOUT THE REPORT

This report was written based on field work conducted by Catherine Coumans in North Mara, Tanzania in September 2022.

COVER PHOTO

March 18, 2022 - Member of Parliament for Tarime Vijijin, Mwita Mwikwabe Waitara, speaking at the funeral of a husband and father allegedly killed by mine police: "the one lying here is not here because he got sick, but because he was murdered." ¹ For more on this case see page 9.

SUMMARY

This report presents findings from research undertaken by MiningWatch Canada in North Mara, Tanzania, in September 2022. The issues addressed in this report have all occurred since Barrick's September 2019 takeover of mine ownership and under Barrick's CEO Mark Bristow. Findings are based on information provided by, among others, elected officials, community leaders, victims of violence by police who receive direct financial and other benefits from the mine (mine police),² and family members of those who have perished as a result of excess use of force by mine police, as well as information provided by victims of violent and inequitable forced evictions, the legality of which is questionable.³

The current impacts of the North Mara Gold Mine on the Kuria people surrounding the mine, including particularly high levels of violence by mine police and by officials and Field Force Unit police involved in forced evictions, are reflected against findings from MiningWatch's previous six field visits to the area from 2014 to 2019.

Prior to September 2019, Barrick Gold Corp. (Barrick) held 63.9% of shares in U.K.-based Acacia Mining plc. (Acacia). Acacia, in turn, was 100% owner of the North Mara Gold Mine. In September 2019 Barrick purchased the shares of minority shareholders in Acacia in a \$1.2bn buy-out. In October 2019, an agreement was struck with the Government of Tanzania aimed at addressing a number of conflicts including a serious and ongoing tax dispute. As part of this agreement the Government of Tanzania acquired a 16% free carried shareholding in the mine.⁴ Barrick has management control over Barrick-North Mara.

Against a historical context of pervasive high levels of violence by private mine security⁵ and by mine police against local Kuria people, our field research concludes that excess use of lethal force since Barrick's takeover from Acacia has been particularly high. Simultaneously, access to justice and remedy for victims of mine-related violence and other human rights abuses has become further constrained, and victims are expressing greater hesitation about speaking out about the abuses they suffer as they face a very real threat of further violence by mine police as a consequence. These issues are discussed in this report in the context of:

- Continuity and change in security arrangements at the mine (P. 5)
- Violent forced evictions for mine expansion of questionable legality (P. 11)
- Breakdown of the mine's ineffective and inequitable grievance mechanism (P. 17)
- Greater alignment of local public institutions and officials with mine interests (P. 18)



Photo: Drooping wall clock on elementary school wall in the village of Komarera. Left over from the African Barrick Gold days. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2015)

HIGH LEVELS OF VIOLENCE - MINE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

BACKGROUND

As the North Mara mine's pits, its waste rock dumps, tailings impoundment and infrastructure have continued to expand onto the land of nearby Kuria villagers, these villagers have increasingly struggled to access sufficient land for their food security and for grazing their cattle. They have also lost income from small-scale mining of the near-surface gold deposits on their lands now covered by the mine.

Over the years, whole families have taken to eking out a living by seeking remnants of gold in the, until recently, openly accessible waste rock dumps around the mine.⁶ Additionally, mainly young men have breached the mine's high walls and entered the mine site itself in search of gold bearing rocks, at times aided by police guarding the mine in return for payments.⁷ While in the waste rock dumps, men, women and children were vulnerable to being beaten or shot at by the mine's private security, known locally as "Mobiles," using primarily teargas canisters and rubber bullets,⁸ or by Field Force Units of the police, on duty as mine police, who also use live ammunition. They were also raped,⁹ suffered life-altering and lethal beatings with batons and sticks by mobiles and mine police, and were violently arrested by mine police. Inside the mine walls, primarily men were subject to being shot at by mine police and private mine security with live ammunition and other projectiles, such as teargas canisters, severely beaten, and arrested.



Photo: Women and children scavenging for residual gold in one of the mine's waste rock dumps. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2016)



Photo: Previous to September 2019, armed private security, known locally as "Mobiles." (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2017)

Violence by mine police has never stopped at the mine walls. Frequently mine police chase trespassers fleeing the mine through nearby villages endangering their inhabitants. There have also long been cases of violent arrests of villagers outside the mine's walls, on public roads and spaces, on dubious charges, including that these villagers may be planning to illegally enter mine territory.

In previous releases¹⁰ we have reported on our documentation of these abuses over six years (2014-2019), covering over a hundred cases of excess use of force by both private security and 5 mine police against Kuria villagers at the North Mara Gold Mine. And we have assessed the mine's grievance mechanism that has consistently failed to provide remedy for those harmed.

Regular violent assaults on local Kuria by private mine security and mine police were reported on in-depth in the media as early as 2011.¹¹ It is in fact chilling to re-read this reporting and realize how little has changed in the following decade. At that time the North Mara mine was 100% owned by U.K.-based African Barrick Gold.¹² This media exposure ultimately contributed to legal action filed in the U.K. in 2013 by the firm Leigh Day on behalf of some of the victims of these violent assaults and family members of deceased victims. In November 2014, just months before the Leigh Day case was settled out of court in 2015, African Barrick Gold underwent a rebranding to Acacia Mining. The violence against local Kuria by mine security continued and was even particularly acute in 2014 and 2015 when MiningWatch started to document these cases. In 2020 a second law suit on behalf of victims and their families was filed in the U.K., by the firm Hugh James, against Barrick Tz Limited.¹³ That law suit is ongoing. Despite back to back law suits on behalf of some of the victims of violence by mine security, levels of violence have remained high.



Photo: Armed Field Force Units of the police on mine duty. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2017)

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SINCE BARRICK'S 2019 TAKEOVER OF ACACIA

Security arrangements in place at the North Mara mine after Barrick acquired Acacia, in September 2019, show both signs of continuity as well as some significant changes made by Barrick. Both the security arrangements that Barrick has not changed, as well as some of the changes Barrick has brought in, have led to high levels of death and life-altering injuries as a result of excess use of force by mine police since September 2019. Furthermore, Barrick has failed to address long-standing causes of killings, life-altering beatings, and arbitrary arrests such as mine police pursuits of trespassers outside of the mine and mine police accosting people on public roads or when they need to cross mine land to reach their homes.

Most significantly, Barrick has failed to sever ties with the police Field Force Units, whose track record at the mine is one of habitual excess use of force leading to loss of life and serious injuries. In fact, the role of mine police seems to be further entrenched with the 16% partnership in the mine with the Government of Tanzania, announced in October 2019. MiningWatch was told by multiple reliable sources, including elected village officials of that time, that shortly after the partnership was announced government officials met with elected village officials and told them that if villagers go to the mine site they will be shot.

Barrick replaced the mine's private security, both the international armed security personnel known as "Mobiles" by villagers and the KK Security Ltd, with a Tanzanian security outfit called Nguvu Moja Security Ltd. (Nguvu Moja). MiningWatch was told by a reliable source that Nguvu Moja were formed by former Inspector General of Police, Simon Sirro, along with retired and active military officers, to be employed for security purposes by mining companies. Simon Sirro was removed as Inspector General of Police in July of this year by Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan "amid criticism over recent human rights violations by the country's 6 security officers."¹⁴ Nguvu Moja describe themselves as a "Tanzanian security company that is primarily made up of a committed band of brothers from the Tanzania Special Forces Commandos, Tanzania Peoples Defence Force (TPDF), Police and National Service. Most leadership positions are filled by ex-Commandos"¹⁵ and "privileged to provide security to notable Barrick Gold Tanzania Mine Sites and to three other Extractive Mining Industries in the Lake Victoria Green Belt Zone."¹⁶ They seek to recruit "energetic youths who have undergone military training in National Service (Operation Magufuli and Operation Kikwete), Special forces retirees, Para military Soldiers and other people from other national security organs."¹⁷

Initially the Nguvu Moja deployed to the North Mara mine were armed, but after just a few months they were disarmed and remain so today. MiningWatch spoke to a few villagers who said that, although disarmed, the Nguvu Moja will severely beat people they are able to catch – as one villager said "*in sensitive areas of the body such as the joints and head,*" but MiningWatch has not documented any such cases to date. The Nguvu Moja carry out foot patrols and have white light vehicles (LVs) at their disposal, and, like the "Mobiles" before them, operate inside the mine's walls.

Photo: Nguvu Moja at North Mara. (Barrick Gold)¹⁸



Another significant change is that Barrick has greatly expanded the use of walls around the mine, heightened existing walls and increased electrification on these walls. In particular Barrick has walled in massive mine waste dumps around the Gokona underground mine and the Nyabirama open pit operation. The residual gold in these waste rock dumps had been a significant source of income for neighbouring Kuria, one that men and women, often with children, were willing to risk a certain level of danger to access. That level of danger has now significantly increased leaving mainly men to risk their lives to scale the walls in order to eke out a living in the mine's waste dumps. Once inside these walls these men face far greater risk of being harmed by mine police as they cannot easily escape.

The arrangements Barrick has with mine police show the greatest continuity with the time of Acacia. The police that operate both inside the mine walls and outside of them are Field Force Units (FFU). These are "a special division in the national police force" that "has responsibility for controlling unlawful demonstrations and riots."¹⁹ They are distinguishable from other police by their green khaki uniforms and red berets. They are rotated in from regions outside of the mining area. In the words of a Nyabichune villager ***"these are mine police, they come specifically to guard the mine, they stay for two to three months, they are the mine force."***

We have previously reported that the presence and role of FFU at the North Mara Mine is supported by a Memorandum of Understanding between "RPC (TARIME-RORYA SPECIAL ZONE) and successors TANZANIA POLICE FORCE, COMMUNITY POLICING UNIT (PHQ) AND NORTH MARA GOLD MINE LIMITED."²⁰ We were able to view a 2010 version of such an MOU; these have been updated over time. The 2010 version clearly lays out the relationship between the mine and the FFU stating "The Company will provide the Police with required assistance as specified within this Memorandum of Understanding (this "MoU"), and the Police will provide community policing services and maintain law and order in and around the Mine Site."

Under the 2010 MOU the mine has a measure of control over police stationed at the mine: "The Company shall have the right to suggest to the police administration to remove a particular Police officer from the Mine Site if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the particular Police officer is jeopardizing common efforts of the police and the Company to maintain law and order in and around the Mine Site." In return for services by the FFU, the mine provides support to the police as laid out in the 2010 MOU. This support includes: fuel for the police vehicles; "standard commercial passenger vehicles for use in and around the Mine Site" specifying that "The use of any vehicles will be limited to performing official Police functions in and around the Mine Site."; per diems "[o]nly Police officers who have been designated and listed in the roster as working at the Mine Site (or around the Mine Site), and introduced to the Mine Site Security Manager, are eligible to receive per diems.... The Company shall maintain a list of names of Police officers working on the Mine Site, which may be used as the signoff sheet for proper payment of per diems to Police officers on the Mine Site."; accommodation and meals.



Photo: Field Force Units driving towards the mine to report for duty. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2015)

A reliable source told MiningWatch that 4 - 6 of the commanders of the FFU are accommodated within the mine site, the rest come in from outside in shifts.

A specific unit of FFU operating around the mine are the Crisis Response Team, or CRT. These are particularly feared for their aggressive use of violence. One reliable source on police arrangements around the mine called these forces “broken people” because of the level of violence in which they are commonly engaged.

The CRT are often seen in the village of Nyabichune. Nyabichune is very close to the Nyabirama open pit and is a particularly tense area as a main public road passes right along the mine wall with the Nyabirama pit behind it. The proximity is so great that in 2019 MiningWatch met with villagers from



Photo: The above three images show the proximity of public roads and village homes to mine walls and the Nyabirama pit beyond. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2018)

Nyabichune who complained that sometimes when the mine blasts, rocks from the blast site arc into the village hitting houses and sometimes people. One mother told MiningWatch that her infant son had been hit by one such blast rock and died as a result.

Tension between villagers and mine police, particularly the CRT, have been intense over the past three years. In September MiningWatch heard multiple accounts of unwarranted arrests of people making their way along the public road in Nyabichune, including women. For example, mine police often close the public road for through traffic after six pm. If people need to use the road after six pm they are commonly arrested and may be beaten in the process. In the case of small groups of young men found on this road at any time of day, these arrests are commonly violent. MiningWatch heard from multiple sources that young men found together on the public road in Nyabichune are often surrounded, beaten and dragged into the mine site. Once there they are photographed, arrested, detained at the police station, and accused of having entered the mine site illegally.

According to a Nyabichune villager, the village chairman of Nyabichune is continually bringing complaints about arbitrary arrests along this road to the mine and to the police with no result:

“The village chairman will take a complaint to the [mine’s] grievance mechanism and they scold him and send him away...he asks them to have his people not harassed but they don’t care...He goes to the police and the police say they will work on it, but those same police are with the mine.”

In another case, a villager from the hamlet of Masinki in the village of Nyabichune described the situation in which he, his family, and others from that hamlet find themselves. In order to reach his house, he has to pass through land that has been purchased by the mine surrounding the hamlet on three sides. This land is guarded by mine police, often CRT. He described being commonly challenged and harassed by these police, accused of planning to steal rocks from the mine:

“For me to go home I have to pass through the mine area...now I am stopped on my motorbike driving towards my home and they accuse me of wanting to go to the mine. Can someone go to the mine with a motorbike, where can you pass through?” This person said ***“I’ve been beaten three times, I’ve been stopped many times, I’ve already been taken to the court more than three times and I am never going to the mine.”***

A villager from Nyangoto told MiningWatch:

“People have lost hope...what is happening there is a big injustice. Sometimes they [mine police] detain people who are outside the mine and take them inside the mine and take photos of them, then they take them to the police station. When they reach the police station they hand these people over to the same police. What do you think will be done?”

We have reported previously on cases in which mine police have shot trespassers in the back even as they have sought to flee mine areas. This year MiningWatch was told by multiple people about a recent case in which a fleeing villager was shot from behind by a so-called sound bomb before he could get over the mine’s wall. The massive impact caused his death. This use of a sound bomb as a weapon was not one MiningWatch has heard about previously and indicates an escalation in the levels of excess use of force by mine police. We were also told that the use of these sound bombs had caused damage to village houses.

The fact that the mine’s waste rock dumps have now been walled in is another reason for an increase in injuries and deaths as a result of excess use of force by mine police. One father, who lost his teenage son in 2020, told MiningWatch that his son had gone with friends to one of the waste rock dumps. He was inexperienced in going to the dumps in search of gold. A gate in the wall now surrounding that dump was open and village men had entered. According to eye witness accounts the father received after his son’s death, his son had not gone very far inside when police showed up in force.



Photo: A waste rock dump near the Nyabirama open pit when the dumps were not yet walled in. The white wall at the top of the image surrounds the pit. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2018)

As his son and others attempted to leave the waste rock area through the open gate they found themselves cut off by a police vehicle. According to these witness accounts mine police both beat the trapped villagers with batons and shots were fired. His son lost his life inside the mine walls that day. Previously, it would have been easier for villagers to flee excess use of force by mine police as the dumps were wide open and allowed for greater possibility of escape.

Perhaps an early indication of changes to mine police practices leading to high levels of death and injury came just months after Barrick took over from Acacia in September 2019. Two brothers from Nyamongo set out to one of the still un-walled-in mine waste dumps as was their daily practice. As one brother told MiningWatch: "When we wake up in the morning we go to the mine to pick up the waste rocks." When mine police showed up and told the villagers gathered there to leave, the brothers started to leave:

"The police coming there was a normal thing. So when they came we were already used to them. But that day they came differently. When they came they fired teargas bombs. We thought it was a normal thing because it has been like this in Nyamongo."

But this day, unexpectedly the mine police started firing live ammunition profusely. According to the brother MiningWatch met with, one police officer took direct aim at his brother and said *"I am going to shoot you."* The officer shot and killed the brother. The brothers were in close proximity when it happened and there were many family members who were witnesses. Still there has been no investigation or justice in this case of excess use of force. As the surviving brother told MiningWatch:

"Us people in Nyamongo, when a person dies we just let it go because there is no justice there so you just let it go... We didn't expect to get any justice because similar incidents have happened and there was no justice."

We have previously reported on cases in which large numbers of mine police have continued to pursue fleeing trespassers even after these have managed to leave the mine area. These wild pursuits have regularly led to maiming and deaths among uninvolved villagers. These deadly chases have not ceased under Barrick's control of the mine. MiningWatch was told by numerous people we met with about a particular high profile example that occurred earlier this year in which mine police continued chasing a man after he had left the mine site through a nearby village where mine police shot and killed a husband and father who had nothing to do with the incident.

This recent death by mine police caused the local area Member of Parliament, Mwita Mwikwabe Waitara, to speak passionately at the victim's funeral.²¹ Pointing to the coffin he said: *"the one lying here is not here because he got sick, but because he was murdered."* In calling for the mine's help for the surviving family members MP Waitara pointed out *"those police were guarding your mine."* MP Waitara spoke not only about the murder of that one person by mine police, but also the unacceptably high levels of killings by mine police generally *"this is not new in Nyamongo, we have spoken a lot about these incidents of youth getting shot"* and he pointed out that the graveyards are full of young men who have been shot.

MP Waitara also noted that these killings are not happening at other mines. Referring to a mine in Geita MP Waitara said *"we don't see this type of incident happening at that mine."* MP Waitara named the problem of failure by the mine to take responsibility for the actions of the mine police by saying *"they are still playing ball between the mine and the police"* noting *"I spoke with the General Manager of the North Mara Gold Mine, he is saying its true they took the police to guard the mine but...they did not tell the police to shoot people."* MP Waitara also pointed out the broader failures of the mine to behave responsibly including such basic things as meeting a large number of commitments made by the mine to source food for the mine locally, to hire locals for basic jobs at the mine, and to provide clean drinking water: *"we don't have farm land, we cannot pass on our roads, when you pass you get shot, we are not given employment, how can we survive?"*

SECTION CONCLUSIONS

To conclude this section, many of the reasons for the high levels of life-altering injuries and deaths related to excess use of force, and continued unlawful violent arrests and detainment at the North Mara Gold Mine are not new, but these have not been addressed by Barrick. Primary among these is the continued use by the mine of the armed Field Force Units and their Critical Response Team as the main way of addressing mine security. However, even simple things that would ease tension and personal injury, such as providing villagers from the hamlet of Masinki passes so that they will not be accosted by mine police when they are forced to travers mine land to get to their homes, or building an alternative road to the one that passes closely to the Nyabirama pit – another long-standing promise not kept by the mine – would be signs that Barrick has a modicum of concern for the safety and well-being of the Kuria surrounding the mine.

A decision by Barrick to expand the use of walls to close off the waste rock dumps to those seeking to eke out a living from the residual gold in these waste rocks has increased risk for those who breach these walls in order to make a daily living in the mine's waste. Unlike before when even women with children could participate in this activity, although not without risk, now mainly men are breaching the walls at the waste rock dumps and becoming trapped by these walls when mine police move in to disperse them with lethal force.

The replacement of armed private security with an unarmed Nguvu Moja, on its face, should have led to lower levels of deaths and serious injuries related to excess use of force. But the incidents of police shooting villagers remains high. It was pointed out to MiningWatch by a village leader that the unarmed private mine security Nguvu Moja, who patrol inside the mine's walls, may have the effect of increasing the police's use of lethal force, much as when police who had made paid arrangements with villagers to allow them to seek waste rocks would start shooting these trespassers whenever the "white man" arrived to oversee security operations.

VIOLENT FORCED EVICTIONS FOR MINE EXPANSION OF QUESTIONABLE LEGALITY

Mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) significantly increases the risks that local people will be impoverished and will end up subsidizing the mining project by giving more than they get. The argument that some must lose so that others may profit (for example, where a national priority overrides local ones) is unacceptable and shatters public support for the industry, particularly if the poorest people are being asked to make sacrifices for the benefit of those perceived as rich. (Mines Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD), 4 March, 2002)²²

The more marginalized a community, and the greater its material wants, the more likely it is that **cash compensation will be a disaster unless it is part of a carefully thought through plan of resettlement.** This is explicitly required by, for example, the World Bank Guidelines. (MMSD Final Report, 2002, Chapter 7, emphasis added)²³

All persons, groups and communities have the right to resettlement, which includes **the right to alternative land of better or equal quality and housing that must satisfy the following criteria for adequacy: accessibility, affordability, habitability, security of tenure, cultural adequacy, suitability of location, and access to essential services such as health and education.** (Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2007)²⁴

Bank experience indicates that **involuntary resettlement under development projects, if unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social and environmental risks:** productive systems are dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive assets or income sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their productive skills may be less applicable and the competition for resources greater; community institutions and social networks are weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help are diminished or lost. (World Bank, 2001, updated 2011, emphasis added)²⁵

Resettlement can be classified as either voluntary or involuntary, and may be either physical or economic. Resettlement is voluntary when resettled households have the choice to move. **When the voluntary nature of resettlement cannot be confirmed, resettlement should be treated as involuntary.** This includes cases where a company has the legal right to take away land. **ICMM company members commit to either avoid or minimise involuntary resettlement. If it is unavoidable, they undertake to manage the process responsibly and in line with international standards and to compensate fairly for adverse effects on the community.** (ICMM online, emphasis added)²⁶

ICMM members and many other companies undertake resettlement activities responsibly and make it their goal to **leave communities better off than they were previously.** (ICMM 2015, emphasis added)²⁷

For the last 20 years international processes and institutions quoted above, with which Barrick is very familiar and of which Barrick is a member (ICMM), have warned that mining induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) is a significant risk factor and a source of impoverishment and homelessness of already marginal and Indigenous peoples.²⁸

Furthermore, the North Mara mine itself has well-publicized legacy concerns regarding rights violations dating back to at least 2003 and related to the failure to fairly compensate local Kuria peoples for loss of land for the opening of the Nyabirama and Gokona pits.²⁹

And yet, Barrick is now complicit in another involuntary eviction process for planned expansion of the North Mara mine that, based on MiningWatch's findings, is not only unfair and of questionable legality, but also inhumane and violent.

The land appropriations taking place in Komarera Village, adjacent to the current Gokona pit, are so inequitable that 32 Kuria villagers have each paid private lawyers a large sum of money³⁰ to file against North Mara Gold Mine Limited to stop their land, houses, and agricultural plants and trees from being bulldozed. In granting a restraining order on August 25, 2022 the presiding judge noted:

In the circumstances, I agree with the applicants' counsel that there are triable issues which if not intervened by the court at the moment, may lead to irreparable loss or breach of peace in the area. Should demolition process be blessed to proceed, it is the applicants who are going to suffer irreparable loss as there will be no evidence for that substantiation and meanwhile, some will be rendered homeless.³¹

While these 32 villagers have secured a restraining order many others, most of whom cannot afford the lawyer's fees, are suffering through an inequitable and violent process that is already making some landless and homeless.



Photo: The lands sought by the North Mara Gold Mine for expansion are in the village of Komarera, to the right of the current pits seen above. (Google Maps)

INEQUITY AND QUESTIONABLE LEGALITY OF THE FORCED EVICTIONS PROCESS

The land appropriations process taking place currently in the village of Komarera is the second phase; the first phase took place in 2021. The process is supposed to be in compliance with the relevant Tanzanian Law of March 2016,³² as referred to on Valuation Form No.3 used in the process.

MiningWatch heard many deviations from the principles and process set out in the March 2016 Law. We detail just some of these alleged deviations here, particularly ones that were highly consistent among the landowners we interviewed who also provided evidence of their concerns.

We heard consistently that the evaluation process was one that took place under considerable threat and intimidation from FFU police who accompanied the assessors.




Photo: Valuation Form No. 3 used in the process ongoing in Komarera Village. Top section. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada)

Commonly there was one FFU police accompanying each pair of assessors. One assessor details (announces) what is found on the property and the other records the findings by hand on Valuation Form No. 3. In case of verbal dissent by the landowner the number of FFU police was often quickly increased and the landowner was subject to violent assault and detention. This is discussed in greater detail below.

Following the initial land assessment (including land area, structures and houses, crops and trees) landowners are requested to sign Valuation Form No. 3 as filled out by hand by the valuator. Note that MiningWatch is aware through our work in the area since 2014 that many of these villagers cannot read or write and so could only sign by finger/thumb print. This was confirmed in the documents we reviewed. The landowner is not given a copy of this signed form and we were told by multiple people that they were also not allowed to take a picture of it.

After they sign the Valuation Form No. 3, someone from the assessment team³³ subsequently re-values various items on their property, making changes to the form by hand. In all cases that MiningWatch was able to assess these changes led to significant reductions in the overall value of the property. A major concern expressed by multiple landowners is that after they signed the valuation form, the most valuable and most numerous plantings were devalued by reducing the percentage of growth ascribed to them. In one such example reviewed by MiningWatch, close to two hundred mature fruit bearing trees, had their ascribed value reduced from 25% growth to 15% growth *after* the landowner had signed Valuation Form 3 and the landowner was told that 15% growth would not receive any payment.



Photo: A fingerprint as signature on a Valuation Form No.3 (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada)




Photo: Changed value from 25% growth to 15% growth after the landowner signed the valuation form. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada)

MiningWatch has also seen examples where all plantings on a property were evaluated at 15% on Valuation Form 3 and the only payment assessed was for the land area itself. It is questionable whether the “rule” being applied by the assessment team of not paying for plants assessed at 15% growth is legal. In the 2016 Tanzanian Law governing land expropriations notes (p. 14) under heading 8.2 “Placing Percentages (%) of growth in Crop Valuation” the text notes that:

The appraiser should try to be careful in setting the percentage, by ensuring that the percentage of growth set is proportional to the size of the plant. The main growth percentages are as follows.

1. Producing Plants/Trees ===== 100%
2. Mature Plants/Trees ===== 60%
3. Young plants/trees ===== 30%
4. Old Plants/Trees ===== 50%




Photo: Signatures below that of the landowner: Name of the local leader and his/ her signature, name of the evaluator and his/ her signature, name of the land surveyor and his/ her signature. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada)

There is no percentage for trees here of 25% let alone 15% and no indication in the law that plants of 15% growth should not receive any payment. Only after a second review of Valuation Form 3 is completed, is the form signed off on by village officials. MiningWatch was told about cases in which the landowner had complained to their

village officials about injustices in the assessment process and village officials had been told by leadership of the assessment team that they should not be hesitant to sign because the landowner had already signed.

With respect to houses, a piece of land may have multiple inhabitable houses as often multiple related families will build on a single piece of land. MiningWatch was alerted to cases in which none of the houses on a property were acknowledged on the assessment, or only those of the least value, such as houses with grass roofs and mud brick sides rather than concrete houses with metal roofs. We also heard multiple accounts in which a house was acknowledged and recorded by the initial assessors, but after the landowner had signed the form they were told that prior aerial assessments had not seen a house so there would be no compensation for the house. This occurred in one case documented by MiningWatch in which the owner had grown up in the house and was living in it when the assessors came. As one elected official told MiningWatch,

“Other people, their houses existed there for a long time, they come and say they flew their plane over, but I don’t know what plane they are talking about. They say these houses are not seen so they are not going to pay for these homes...there are people who have been living there for 50 years but they are claiming that they did not see those houses and they are not going to pay.”

MiningWatch was also told of cases in which land was assessed while the landowner was not present. Landowners sometimes arrive at their land to find a large stone painted white with a number on it. They are expected to take that number to the head of the assessment team when he is in the area so that the landowner can see how their land was assessed and sign the form.




Photo: MiningWatch has also seen this case in which the land acreage was not recorded at all for payment. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada)

In all cases from 2021, in which payments have already been made, MiningWatch was told that the payments were so low that the landowner could never buy back that same amount of land nor plant the same crops nor build the houses that had been on their land for the amount they received. In fact, MiningWatch is aware of at least two families who have had to leave their traditional lands and move to nearby cities to try to make a landless living. This experience is fundamentally opposed to principles set out in international human rights law³⁴ that recognizes that only if individuals and communities are compensated at a greater rate than the value of their lands and properties do they have a chance of coming through forced evictions without becoming impoverished, food insecure and homeless.

In all cases MiningWatch is aware of in which landowners have tried to protest the process or the assessments, this did not go well for them. Aside from facing violence, as described below, landowners have written letters to the mine manager and taken complaints to the mine's grievance office to no avail. Some have not accepted payments or not cashed cheques received. Others are still living on their land even as it is fenced off and bulldozers are approaching as they have nowhere else to go.

VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION IN THE FORCED EVICTION PROCESS

The heavy presence of FFU police in the land assessment process is a strong indication of the level of intimidation, threat of violence, and actual violence associated with the involuntary evictions of local Kuria from Komarera to make way for mine expansion. There is commonly one FFU officer with each pair of assessors. But as assessment teams tend to come in larger numbers, for example 20 teams fanning out over an area, there are at least 20 FFU police on site as well.

MiningWatch heard numerous cases of landowners being assaulted if they questioned the land assessment process or the assessments themselves. In one case a man, who owned a number of parcels of land and houses, had already been vocal about his opposition to the inequitable valuations of his land and property. When the assessors came to a piece of his land with numerous mature trees he heard the assessor say that the head of the assessment team, Rashid,³⁵ had told the assessors to just value all his plants at 15%. As the assessors followed these instructions the landowner complained: *"my trees are big enough for timber and they have fruits, at least give them 50% or more."* According to the landowner, one of the assessors called Rashid, who came to the site with a head of the FFU, a man in a khaki uniform with two stars on his shoulder. The landowner was so badly beaten on his head with a baton with metal extensions that he required hospital care and still suffers side effects.



Photo: Head wounds a landowner suffered when he was beaten for opposing the low assessment of his trees. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2022)

In another case, an older landowner became aware that the mine wanted a part of his land when he saw it had been marked: *"when they came and marked my land they did not involve me, they did not discuss anything with me."* Later he was unaware that the assessors had come. He was alerted to their presence on his land by a neighbour so he rushed over. He questioned the process, opposed the assessment until there had been a discussion about the price for his property. According to this landowner the assessors called Rashid who arrived with a head of the FFU, a man in a khaki uniform with a star on his shoulder. According to the landowner. *"Rashid came with the police. I thought he was coming to give me the price but he came and started punching and kicking me. The police were there and they did not help me."* After being allegedly beaten by Rashid this man was detained for many hours while his land was assessed.

In another case, a man refused to sign Valuation Form 3 because he felt it did not fairly assess his property. An FFU policeman who was with the assessors turned to the man's farming assistant and said he should sign the form. This man initially refused, but then was badly beaten until he relented and signed the form. So in this case the name on the form is not the actual landowner.

One man explained that he had just been released from hospital with a serious illness when the assessors came to his land. He tried to protest the low values they ascribed to his property, but due to his illness and weakness he gave up saying *"ok pay me whatever you want."* He subsequently received a payment form, but never got a cheque. As the bulldozers were nearing his land he went in search of the assessment team's leader, Rashid. When he found him in the mine's grievance mechanism office and explained that he had not yet been paid, the assessment team leader tore up his papers and reportedly said, *"well, now you have no more evidence."*

WHERE IS BARRICK IN THIS PROCESS?

An elected official told MiningWatch that in March of this year Barrick CEO Mark Bristow met with village officials. The conversation was one way only, elected officials did not speak. According to the elected official: *"He [Bristow] said that he wanted the land acquisition process to go well and for the people to receive good payments so that he can have a good relationship with the people, in other words the relationship is not a good one."* The elected official told MiningWatch that Bristow also talked about the mine expansion he wanted to move ahead with and that he would prefer not to have to build more big walls.

Barrick came up, by name, repeatedly in the conversations MiningWatch had with villagers affected by forced evictions in Komarera. Mainly they pointed to the fact that the mine's name (NMGM) is on the forms associated with the forced eviction and on the cheques they receive, but the mine's personnel are missing in action: *"Barrick is not coming to talk to us."* Quite a few people said they wanted Barrick to come to talk to them, to sit down and discuss the situation with them, to work something out in a good way, rather than send the government officials. One person described the situation as one of preparations for a wedding in which discussions and preparations are had to exchange bridewealth, but, strangely enough, the parents are not involved. Participation and agency of those who are to be affected by a forced eviction is in fact what best practice in forced evictions requires.

Barrick has a section on its resettlement policies (p.47) in its Human Rights report of December 2021³⁶ that bears no resemblance to what is actually happening to the landowners in Komarera at the North Mara mine. Barrick says it seeks to "make sure that the affected parties are fully engaged in, and help to shape, the resettlement process" while people in Komarera keep asking where Barrick is and when the company will come talk to them. Also Barrick says it seeks to [i]mplement a mitigation hierarchy during project design and implementation; and [i]mprove or at least restore the relocated persons' standard of living." MiningWatch can say definitively based on the experiences of the people from Komarera with whom we have spoken that these commitments from Barrick are not being implemented.

SECTION CONCLUSIONS

The forced evictions are marked by intimidation and violence and are causing people to lose the land that is the source of their food security and livelihood and to lose their homes. The assessment process is ensuring that the people in Komarera are not made whole and indeed appears geared at saving the company money on the backs of people who can least afford to be subsidizing a gold mine.

Barrick is complicit in this process as it is being done to allow Barrick to continue earning money from gold mining in North Mara. Barrick has to be completely aware of the forced eviction concerns raised by residents of Komarera, as MiningWatch has seen a letter written to the Mine Manger, has heard from numerous residents that they have brought their concerns to the mine's grievance mechanism, and, of course, a small group have managed to take legal action and get a restraining order. MiningWatch is now adding its voice to those from Komarera in bringing this to Barrick's attention. Barrick has a duty to do serious due diligence on this process.

But for now, to halt the bulldozers bearing down on peoples land, homes, and lives, Barrick should immediately call a halt to the forced eviction process and voluntarily expand the court ordered restraining order to all properties targeted for mine expansion until a proper review of the legality and human rights implications of the process can be established and the harm already done can be addressed.

BREAKDOWN OF THE MINE'S ALREADY INEFFECTIVE AND INEQUITABLE GRIEVANCE MECHANISM

The establishment and evolution of a project-level grievance mechanism at the North Mara mine has always been problematic. The first version of a grievance mechanism was put in place in 2012 and used to thwart legal action by Leigh Day on behalf of victims of excess use of force by mine security. Mine personnel reached out to Leigh Day's clients, and others who may have become clients in the law suit, such as victims of rape by mine security, and offered them compensation packages in return for dropping their legal claims and signing legal waivers against participation in any future legal action



against the mine.³⁷ Painfully the mine created make-work projects for the victims of violence by mine security allowing them to earn their own remedy. Rape victims were set to work sewing clothes. At the end of the project they had to fight to be allowed to keep the machines.

Photo: Sewing machine in the home of one of the victims of rape by mine security. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada, 2018)

After the rebranding of African Barrick Gold to Acacia, a consultant was brought in to overhaul the grievance mechanism, but as MiningWatch has reported on,³⁸ the new more involved process was no more effective in practice in actually providing relief to those who had suffered serious injuries, or to the families of those who had died at the hands of mine security.

Villagers were pitted against the mine's lawyers in the process and found their documents confiscated and their cases repeatedly rejected. MiningWatch was able to find a lawyer who was willing to represent the injured community members in the process, but he too soon realized that as long as the mine had final say in who would receive remedy, and how much, the system was inequitable.³⁹

When Barrick took over operational control of the mine in September 2019 the grievance mechanism was essentially shut down. MiningWatch spoke to two community members who, in 2019, had been invited to sit on a new "Community Consultation Body ("CCB") as part of the new grievance mechanisms structures. They both confirmed that the CCB and the grievance mechanism as a whole was abruptly shut down once Barrick took over. Similarly the lawyer who MiningWatch had brought into the process also confirmed that his ongoing work with two clients who were in the grievance mechanism process came to an abrupt halt. One of the members of the former Community Consultation Body with whom MiningWatch spoke said that after Barrick took over the management of the mine in September 2019 he was invited to join a newly formed Community Development Committee. But it too was later shut down under a cloud of corruption.

The grievance office is still open in Nyamongo, but all efforts by villagers to have it address claims of excess use of force by mine police, or harm caused by the forced evictions, have been fruitless. Villagers have told MiningWatch with great consistency that there is no more intake process or evaluation process through the office, let alone hope of remedy. They are just told to come back over and over again until they give up. As one villager told MiningWatch:

"All the complaints are taken to the grievance mechanism office, we are taking our complaints there, but none of them are being resolved. You can even wait a year and sometimes you give up....we don't have any other place to take our complaints other than the grievance mechanism, if there was another place we could take the complaint there."

GREATER ALIGNMENT OF LOCAL PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND OFFICIALS WITH MINE INTERESTS

A noticeable change with the 16% participation of the Government of Tanzania in the mine is a further closing down of public space to critique the mine or to seek remedy for the harm it causes local Kuria.

As noted above, shortly after the agreement between Barrick and the Government of Tanzania came into force, in October 2019, government officials met with elected community leaders and enforced the message that the government was now fully supporting the mine and that anyone going into the mine site can expect to be met with a bullet. Previous governments had at least at times expressed concern about the high level of casualties at the mine and even launched an investigation into the violence.⁴⁰

Now villagers told MiningWatch that there was no point bringing their mine-related complaints to their elected village leaders as these are now all “with the mine” and even receiving payments from the mine. Village chairmen, hamlet chairmen, and ward councillors, although elected, are not paid for their services. The only position that is paid is that of the appointed village executive officer. This makes village chairmen particularly susceptible to payments from the mine. A reliable source told MiningWatch that all village chairmen are now received 450,000 TZS per month from the mine, as well as data payments for their phones.

Although local village police had already been hesitant to support villagers in cases where they had been abused by the FFU mine police, this lack of support from village police has also apparently worsened. Whenever someone is injured by another person in Tanzania, be it police or another citizen, they require a PF3, provided by a policeman who has to sign it, in order to receive medical care.⁴¹ The police usually briefly describe the injury and medical practitioners provide further details. The PF3s are often a critical piece of information in any legal action that may ensue. We had already noticed that local police went out of their way to avoid describing obvious bullet wounds in victims of excess use of force by mine police as such, often using terms such as “puncture wound” instead. However, in the case described above of a villager from Komarera who was badly beaten by an FFU policeman when he refused to sign the Valuation Form 3, he found that a local policeman refused to issue a PF3, not wanting to put his signature on it. That villager had to get a letter from his hamlet chairman in order to get much needed medical attention. We heard that obtaining a PF3 for harm done by mine police was now very difficult.

In its human rights report Barrick touts its improved community relations at North Mara “[n]owhere is this progress more evident than at North Mara, where community relations have been radically repaired.”⁴² But more than ever before, MiningWatch heard villagers say that they don’t know where to go to address the harm they are experiencing from excess use of force by mine police and through the forced evictions as the grievance mechanism is not functioning and their village leaders are now “with the mine.”




Photo: The top section of a PF3. (Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada)

NOTES

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TJZCTwgjPU>

² Arrangements between Tanzanian police and the mine are discussed in more detail starting on page 3. We use the term “mine police” in this report to refer to those Field Force Unit police who are posted to the mine, work both inside the mine walls and in the surrounding communities, and, among other benefits, receive bonus payments from the mine for their services.

³ Every effort is made in this report to protect the identities of those who have provided MiningWatch Canada information given the very real threat of violent repercussions faced by those who speak about mine-related human rights abuses. Therefore exact dates and locations and names of victims and their families are not provided.

⁴ A new Tanzanian-based operating company called Twiga Minerals Corporation (Twiga) has been formed to manage the North Mara Mine, as well as Barrick’s two other mines in Tanzania, Bulyanhulu and Buzwagi.

⁵ The North Mara Gold Mine has both private and public mine security. The mine’s private security is paid by Barrick, the public security, police, are paid both through public funds and payments from the mine. For further details see the next section.

⁶ These dumps have become walled off after Barrick’s acquisition of Acacia post-September 2019. This is discussed further in the following section.

⁷ These arrangements could become deadly, for example if “the white man” appeared to oversee operations, or after a shift when new police who had not been paid took over. In these cases police would often open fire, even on those who had paid them to enter.

⁸ The private security of the mine, or mobiles, were also armed with live ammunition guns, but most shootings in the waste rock dumps were by mine police.

⁹ See 2018 video MiningWatch produced on this topic Silent No More: Women Speak Out About Mining Violence. Video in which women rape victims speak out - <https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2018/6/25/women-speak-out-aboutabuse-barrick-gold-s-north-mara-mine-tanzania>

¹⁰ “Boxing with My Hands Tied Behind My Back”: Barrick Grievance Mechanism in Tanzania Not Fair, Say Lawyer, Village Representatives. 2019. <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2019/6/11/boxing-my-hands-tied-behind-myback-barrick-grievance-mechanism-tanzania-not-fair-say> ; Inequality of Arms: A summary of concerns raised by victims of violence by private and public mine security at Barrick Gold’s North Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania regarding the mine’s new Operation-level Grievance Mechanism. 2018. https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/north_mara_final_brief_-_inequality_of_arms_september_2018_-_clean_0.pdf ; Review of Barrick Gold/Acacia Mining’s Draft “Community Grievance Process – Standard Operating Procedure” for the North Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania. 2018. https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/review_of_new_north_mara_grievance_mechanism_april_2018_final_0.pdf ; Anger Boils Over at North Mara Mine – Barrick/Acacia Leave Human Rights Abuses Unaddressed. 2017. https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/2017_field_report_final_-_anger_boils_over_at_north_mara_mine.pdf ; Adding Insult to Injury at the North Mara Gold Mine, Tanzania. 2016. https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/adding_insult_to_injury_north_mara_0.pdf ; Broken Bones and Broken Promises: Barrick Gold Fails to Address Ongoing Violence at Tanzania Mine. 2015 <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2015/11/17/broken-bones-and-broken-promises-barrick-gold-fails-address-ongoingviolence> ; Violence Ongoing at Barrick Mine in Tanzania: MiningWatch Canada and RAID (UK) Complete Human Rights Assessment. 2014. <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2014/8/5/violence-ongoing-barrick-mine-tanzaniaminingwatch-canada-and-raid-uk-complete-human>

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- ¹¹ See in particular Geoffrey York's piece for the Globe and Mail. Barrick Gold's Tanzanian headache: Blood and Stone – <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/barricks-tanzanian-project-tests-ethical-mining-policies/article559188/> September 2022. And for recent coverage see: Toronto Star. Reporters investigated abuse and corruption at a Barrick gold mine in Tanzania. They faced threats and censorship. 2019. <https://www.thestar.com/news/investigations/2019/06/13/reporters-investigated-abuse-and-corruption-at-a-barrickgold-mine-in-tanzania-they-faced-threats-and-censorship.html> ; Canada brushed off abuse complaints against Barrick-linked gold miner in Tanzania, emails show. National Observer. 2019. <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2019/7/10/canada-brushed-abuse-complaints-against-barrick-linked-gold-minertanzania-emails>
- ¹² Barrick established African Barrick Gold in 2010 and has varied its shareholding in both African Barrick Gold and Acacia over the years. In 2011 Barrick owned 74% of Africa Barrick Gold.
- ¹³ Tanzanian Victims Commence Legal Action Against Barrick Gold in UK. February 2020. <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2020/2/10/tanzanian-victims-commence-legal-action-against-barrick-gold-uk>
- ¹⁴ Note that <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/tanzania-appoints-new-police-chiefs-simon-sirro-namedambassador-to-zimbabwe-221169/>
- ¹⁵ <https://mabumbe.com/cmp/nguvu-moja-security-services/>
- ¹⁶ https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=498206493700792&story_fbid=1565215846999846
- ¹⁷ <https://www.expressz.com/2020/06/security-jobs-at-nguvu-moja-security.html>
- ¹⁸ https://s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/sustainability/Barrick_Human_Rights_Report.pdf
- ¹⁹ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/160147.pdf>
- ²⁰ https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/nmgml-tarime_police_mou_2010.pdf
- ²¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TjZCTWgiPU>
- ²² MMSD Draft Report for Comment, 4 March 2002, Chapter 7. "The Control, Use, and Management of Land" <https://www.iiied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/G00963.pdf>
- ²³ MMSD Final Report Chapter 7. <https://www.iiied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/G00899.pdf>
- ²⁴ See Kothari, M. 2007. "Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement". A/HRC/4/18. www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf
- ²⁵ World Bank Group Operational Policy 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01541/WEB/0_C-104.HTM
- ²⁶ <https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/our-work/social-performance/indigenous-peoples-and-human-rights/avoid-involuntary-relocation>
- ²⁷ https://www.icmm.com/website/publications/pdfs/social-performance/2015/guidance_land-acquisition-and-resettlement.pdf
- ²⁸ See also for example World Bank Group organization International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 5. https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-atifc/policies-standards/performance-standards/ps5
- ²⁹ See for example, <https://www.ajhssr.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/D21533037.pdf> ; <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/barricks-tanzanian-project-tests-ethical-mining-policies/article559188/>
- ³⁰ MiningWatch was told by a villager with land in Komarera that the amount paid for legal fees to date by each of the applicants was 1 Million Tanzanian shillings, equivalent to approximately 600 Canadian dollars.
- ³¹ Document with MiningWatch Canada.
- ³² [mwongozo wa uthamini wa fidia](#) UMETAYARISHWA NA; KITENGO CHA UTHAMINI. WIZARA YA ARDHI, NYUMBA NA MAENDELEO YA MAKAZI. S.L.P 9132. DAR ES SALAAM. MACHI 2016.

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- ³³ Most landowners thought it was the head of the assessment team himself who made the final changes to the values on the Valuation Form 3.
- ³⁴ See Kothari, M. 2007. "Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement". A/HRC/4/18. www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf
- ³⁵ Although everyone MiningWatch interviewed knew Rashid as the head of the assessment team only one person could provide a second name, Rashid Mugeta. MiningWatch did not interview anyone who spoke positively about Rashid. Most descriptions of him and his actions painted him as a cruel and vindictive man
- ³⁶ https://s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/sustainability/Barrick_Human_Rights_Report.pdf
- ³⁷ Barrick Faces Court in London. 5 November 2014. Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada and Shanta Martin, Leigh Day. <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2014/11/5/barrick-faces-court-london>
- ³⁸ Inequality of Arms: A summary of concerns raised by victims of violence by private and public mine security at Barrick Gold's North Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania regarding the mine's new Operation-level Grievance Mechanism. 2018. https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/north_mara_final_brief_-_inequality_of_arms_september_2018_-_clean_0.pdf ; Review of Barrick Gold/Acacia Mining's Draft "Community Grievance Process – Standard Operating Procedure" for the North Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania. 2018. https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/review_of_new_north_mara_grievance_mechanism_april_2018_final_0.pdf
- ³⁹ "Boxing with My Hands Tied Behind My Back": Barrick Grievance Mechanism in Tanzania Not Fair, Say Lawyer, Village Representatives. 2019. <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2019/6/11/boxing-my-hands-tied-behind-my-back-barrick-grievance-mechanism-tanzania-not-fair-say>
- ⁴⁰ 22 September 2016, Tanzanian Government Investigation Receives Hundreds of Reports of Violence and Deaths at North Mara Gold Mine. <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2016/9/22/tanzanian-government-investigation-receives-hundreds-reports-violence-and-deaths>
- ⁴¹ <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8318211/#:~:text=In%20Tanzania%2C%20the%20PF3%20is,transfer%20the%20case%20to%20court>
- ⁴² https://s25.q4cdn.com/322814910/files/doc_downloads/sustainability/Barrick_Human_Rights_Report.pdf